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Abstract 
 This paper sought to determine if antitrust enforcement by the FTC is explained 
by models that explain traditional ouput by regulatory agencies.  The study examines 
different types of antitrust enforcement from the FTC.  The results showed that some 
types of antitrust enforcement fit neatly into Peltzman’s model explaining regulatory 
output, while others are more nuanced and difficult to explain.   
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Chapter 1 
A History of Antitrust Enforcement  
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 The purpose of this paper is to examine three types of regulatory output by 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) considered to be antitrust enforcement and how 
they relate to the business cycle. Specifically, I test Peltzman’s hypothesis on regulatory 
activity of the business cycle.   I begin with an introduction covering the history of 
antitrust enforcement and explaining the types of enforcement covered in this paper.  I 
continue with a literature review that covers Stigler’s The theory of economic regulation, 
from which Peltzman based his hypothesis, and works that tested the hypothesis.  I then 
present a model based on Amacher, Higgins, et al.  Finally, I present my own results and 
conclusion.   
The beginnings of modern antitrust enforcement can be found in British common 
law, which was later transferred to the United States.  The first case involving a “restraint 
of trade” was Horner v. Graves1 in 1831.  This case established that it was alright for 
competitors to enter into agreements to maintain prices or restrict output, but they were 
not allowed to prevent outsiders from competing.  This view continued in the American 
courts with the Missouri state court of appeals upholding an agreement to “sell through 
an exclusive sales agent that apportioned output and fixed prices” in Skrainka v. 
Scharringhausen (Sklar 1988, p96).   
 The Sherman Act (1890) has been interpreted by some as a measure to clarify 
common law regarding competition and allow the federal government to bring cases.  
Stigler (1984) has argued that the Sherman Act simply codified common law.  Based on a 
common law understanding, the federal courts did not interpret the Sherman Act as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  This	  was	  a	  British	  case,	  but	  American	  courts	  often	  cited	  British	  cases	  in	  common	  law	  matters	  at	  this	  time.	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strongly as some politicians had hoped.  This led to the creation of the FTC and the 
Clayton Act (1914).   
 The FTC was created with the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 and 
charged with enforcing the Clayton Act from the same year.  The Clayton Act consisted 
of various measures that were intended to close perceived loopholes in the Sherman Act 
after the Standard Oil and American Tobacco cases and some measures related to 
consumer protection, such as false advertising.  Sections 2 and 7 are the provisions most 
associated with antitrust enforcement.   
 Section 2 prohibited discriminatory pricing “where the effect of such 
discrimination may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create monopoly.”  
The Act, however, allowed differences in price based on “differences in grade, quality, or 
quantity …or that makes only due allowance for differences in the cost of selling or 
transportation”, essentially allowing a more efficient producer a valid defense.  This 
defense was accepted broadly leading to little prosecution of Section 2 until the passage 
of the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936 (Posner 1976).   
 The Robinson-Patman Act is nearly unanimously considered by economists to be 
a law intended to protect producers from competition.  The Robinson-Patman Act simply 
amended section 2 of the Clayton Act, which prohibited price discrimination.  The 
amended section, however, “closed the quantity discount loophole and tightened the cost-
justification defense; and it narrowed the meeting competition defense” (Posner 1976, p. 
26-27) -- essentially barring legal defenses based on efficiency. Ross (1984) confirms this 
	  
	  
4	  
by showing the R-P had a statistically significant negative effect on chain stores, 
specifically grocers.  He also presents anecdotal evidence showing that small 
businessmen obtained other regulations such as “chain store taxes” to hinder competition.  
Ross quotes Rep. Patman--the bill’s namesake-- as saying “there is no place for chain 
stores in the American system.”  Posner (1970) said R-P was “in reality a price control 
rather than an antitrust statute”.  That the bill was intended to protect inefficient 
producers at the expense of consumers is hard to deny.   
 Posner (1976) argues that: “Section 7 of the act forbade certain stock acquisitions, 
and by thus failing to include mergers (a form of asset acquisition) was easily evaded and 
essentially of no importance until the statute was thoroughly overhauled in 1950 by the 
Celler-Kefauver Act.”  Bork (1992, p.200) quotes Senator Kefauver explaining the law 
was intended “simply to plug the loophole in sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act.”  
Despite this, the Supreme Court used several opinions interpreting this law in a manner 
antithetical to the public’s interest causing the law to be utilized in a pro-producer manner 
similar to Robinson-Patman.   
 The Brown Shoe decision has been called by Robert Bork (1992, p. 216) “a 
disaster for rational, consumer-oriented merger policy.”  How Section 7 of the Clayton 
act could transform from an unimportant, mildly pro-consumer regulation into a form of 
protection for small, inefficient producers similar to Robinson-Patman is apparent in 
Chief Justice Burger’s opinion.  He specifically cites the “desirability of retaining ‘local 
control’ over industry and the protection of small business” as an important factor in 
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interpreting Section 7.  He transferred the same objectives of the Robinson-Patman Act 
dealing with prices to merger policy.  The Proctor & Gamble case had the effect of 
declaring that “efficiency was really ...a ‘barrier to entry” (Bork 1993, p. 204). 
 Twenty eight years after the Celler-Kefauver Act Congress passed the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act to allow the FTC and Department of Justice to examine mergers before they 
took place.  This had two purposes:  first, to give the regulators enough information to 
determine the legality of the merger and, also, to give the regulators enough time to seek 
an injunction if it is determined to be illegal (Titus 1979).  In order to achieve this, HSR 
requires that companies notify the Premerger Notification Office before merging under 
certain circumstances.  If the transaction is larger than $63.4 million, then the Premerger 
Notification Office must be informed.  Also, the Premerger Notification Office must be 
notified if the acquiring party has $126.7 million in sales or assets and the party being 
acquired has sales or assets of $12.7 million2.  The Premerger Notification Office then 
passes the information onto the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice.  HSR was passed to allow regulators more time to 
review a merger so they could avoid the mess of dissolving an illegal merger after it was 
finished.  It was not intended to address any problems with merger policy; therefore, I do 
not think enforcement will differ markedly under HSR than prior regulations.   
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  These	  numbers	  are	  from	  the	  2008	  Hart-­‐Scott-­‐Rodino	  Annual	  Report	  to	  Congress.	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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
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A central idea in George Stigler’s The Theory of Economic Regulation is that “the 
state can and does selectively help or hurt a vast number of industries” (Stigler 1971, p3).  
Stigler dismisses the idea that the political process cannot be explained by economic 
theory.  He argues that regulations are sought by certain groups—generally an industry 
itself—to gain regulations for specific purposes.  The industry seeking regulatory 
assistance must, however, recognize the costs in obtaining the regulations.  Stigler posits 
that the cost-benefit-tradeoff faced by industries explains most government regulations.   
 Industry uses the coercive power of the state to achieve regulations that serve four 
broad purposes.  The “most obvious contribution that a group may seek of the 
government is a direct subsidy of money.”  This, however, is difficult to utilize because 
of problems in restricting the number of firms seeking a part of a payment.  For this 
method to be feasible, the industry must either gain corresponding increases in the 
subsidy with each new entrant or bar new entrants from receiving the subsidy.  Either of 
these options would be difficult for a regulator under lobbying pressure, and would thus 
raise the cost of the industry. 
 Another method of raising prices for an industry is restriction “of entry by new 
rivals”.  Reducing entry by rivals reduces competition, but also prevents competitors who 
may have developed more efficient technology from entering.  Stigler offers the Civil 
Aeronautics Board as an example of the “diligence with which the power of control over 
entry will be exercised by a regulatory body”.  Stigler views a tariff as being an artificial 
barrier to entry created by the state.  Because it hinders foreign competitors with 
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presumably less political power it is used more often than entry controls to restrict 
domestic competition.  Just as industries seek to restrict direct competitors, they also use 
the power of the state to raise the price of substitutes, while encouraging compliments.  
The fourth area of regulation sought by industries is price fixing.  Even if the industry 
could prevent entry from outsiders, it would face the same problems of cheating that a 
private cartel faces.  Therefore, industry will often seek regulation of prices.   
 These benefits do have limits and costs.  The industry must divide the benefits of 
the regulation amongst all members of the industry; thus, small producers often receive 
disproportionate gains.  The industry must also deal with “the procedural safeguards 
required of public processes.”  These processes also allow people with other motives an 
influence in decision making.  (As an example Stigler cites the “abandonment of an 
unprofitable rail line”.)  The costs are primarily born in financial and other support for 
political parties.  The industry must be willing to finance get-out-the-vote efforts and 
“educate (or uneducate) members of the industry and of other concerned industries.”   
Sam Peltzman used this theory to develop a model explaining regulatory activity.  
The model takes the form of a regulator who “wants to maximize a majority.”  This 
model accounts for the benefits and costs that an industry must consider when seeking 
regulation.  The model is shown below: 
M =n X f - (N-n) X h, 
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where n is the “number of potential voters in the beneficiary group”, f is the “(net) 
probability that a beneficiary will grant support”, N is the “total number of potential 
voters”, and h is the “(net) probability that he who is taxed (every non-n) opposes”.   
 
Figure I 
 
 Based on this model, Peltzman posits that “the marginal product of a dollar of 
profits must equal the marginal political product of a price cut that also costs a dollar of 
profits...Political equilibrium occurs at [a] tangency between [a] profit hill and an iso-
	  
	  
10	  
majority curve.”  See Figure I (Peltzman 1976, p224).  This means that if profits decrease 
the regulator will allow a price to increase in order to continue maximizing his political 
majority, and if profits rise, the regulator will allow the price to decrease for the same 
reason.  One implication of this position is: “Regulation will tend to be more heavily 
weighted toward ‘producer protection’ in depressions and toward ‘consumer protection’ 
in expansions.”  Testing this hypothesis is the focus of this paper.   
 This hypothesis was tested by Shugart and Tollison (1985) using the regulatory 
output of three agencies.  The control variables are the respective agencies’ budgets, 
various measures of the business cycle, a trend line, and various dummy variables to 
account for changes made to the different agencies.  The output variable for the 
International Trade Commission (ITC) was the investigation of “unfair methods of 
competition” or allegedly selling goods below costs.  These investigations can be viewed 
as hampering price declines during a recession.  Their results showed that “a 1% decline 
in real GDP leads to a 9% increase in completed trade investigations” and that 1% 
increase in the unemployment rate leads to a 1.199% increase in investigations 
completed--both statistically significant at the 1% level.  The output variable for the 
International Commerce Commission (ICC) was “motor carrier operating rights cases”.  
The authors recognize that regulations would affect the various transportation industries 
to differing degrees, but believe that this provides a good proxy for the ICC regulatory 
activity in general.  The results showed that with every 1% decrease in real GDP, there 
was a 1.89% increase in motor carrier rights operating case, and a 1% increase in the 
unemployment rate led to a 0.296% increase in motor rights operating cases.  The output 
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variable for the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) is the “ratio of air carrier route 
applications and amendments disposed of annually to route applications and amendments 
filed”, thus measuring whether or not the CAB was more or less likely to prevent the 
entry of competition.  With each 1% increase in real GDP there was a 2.61% reduction in 
the ratio; with each 1% increase in the unemployment rate the ratio increased by 
0.2964%.  The coefficients for the excess capacity rate and the business failure rate were 
overall less statistically significant and lower in magnitude.  As a whole, Shugart and 
Tollison show strong evidence for Peltzman’s hypothesis, especially when using the 
unemployment rate and real GDP as measures of the business cycle.   
 Amacher, Higgins, Shugart, and Tollison (1985) tested Peltzman’s hypothesis 
using antitrust enforcement data.  They viewed antitrust enforcement to be pro-producer. 
Using R-P cases as the dependent variable and measures of the business cycle, agency 
budget, and a trend line as the dependent variables, Robinson-Patman Act (R-P) 
enforcement was shown to be countercyclical.  With each 1% increase in real GDP R-P 
cases declined by 2.46%; with each 1% increase in the unemployment rate, R-P cases 
declined by 0.67%.  The results for FTC cases net of R-P cases are more ambiguous.  The 
coefficient for real GDP is positive, but only statistically significant at the 10% level.  
The coefficient for the unemployment rate is negative (implying the FTC cases are pro-
cyclical) and statistically significant at the 5% level.  
	  
	  
12	  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
Hypothesis 
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I believe that antitrust enforcement will conform to Peltzman’s hypothesis.  I view 
R-P cases as being pro-producer and, thus, expect they will increase during recessions 
and decline during expansions.  This is consistent with previous literature. The FTC cases 
in the periods 1915-1950 and 1950-1969 are not as clear; therefore, I will not develop a 
hypothesis and will look to the data.  I also examine FTC “second requests for 
information” since the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1978 (HSR).  I am also unclear on what 
the data will show for the HSR second requests.  My reasoning is explained below.   
The Robinson-Patman Act is nearly unanimously considered by economists to be 
a law to protect producers from competition.  The Robinson-Patman Act simply amended 
section 2 of the Clayton Act, which prohibited price discrimination.  The amended 
section, however, “closed the quantity discount loophole and tightened the cost-
justification defense; and it narrowed the meeting competition defense” -- essentially 
barring legal defenses based on efficiency. (Posner 1976, p. 26-27)   Ross (1984) 
confirms this by showing the R-P had a statistically significant negative effect on the 
stock market worth of chain stores, specifically grocers.  He also presents anecdotal 
evidence showing that small businessmen obtained other regulations such as “chain store 
taxes” to hinder competition.  Ross quotes Rep. Patman--the bill’s namesake--as saying 
“there is no place for chain stores in the American system.”  Posner (1970) said R-P was 
“in reality a price control rather than an antitrust statute”.  That the bill was intended to 
protect inefficient producer at the expense of consumers is hard to deny.   
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To develop my reasoning behind the differences in FTC non-Robinson-Patman 
cases occurring before and after the Brown Shoe decision, I rely heavily on Robert 
Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War With Itself.   
Amacher et al argue that “FTC cases net of Clayton Act Section 2 
matters...represent allegations of more traditional antitrust violations such as 
monopolization or collusion, which may be associated with the ‘public interest,’ as well 
as matters nominally linked with pro-consumer regulation, including advertising and 
product defects.”  Support for the fact that these “more traditional antitrust violations” 
were pro-consumer is found in the Sherman Antitrust Act, which the Clayton Act was 
intended to clarify.  Stigler (1984) has argued that the Sherman Act was in the 
consumers’ interest because it simply codified existing common law of restraint of trade 
into a federal law.  Due to the different types of cases brought by the FTC net of 
Robinson-Patman cases it is unclear what the data will show.   
 HSR requires that companies notify the Premerger Notification Office before 
merging under certain circumstances.  The Premerger Notification Office then passes the 
information onto the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice.  The FTC or DOJ then decide if more information on the merger 
is needed for approval.  If this is the case, a second request for information is issued.  
HSR was passed to allow regulators more time to review a merger so they could avoid 
the mess of dissolving an illegal merger after it was finished.  It was not intended to 
address any other problems with merger policy; therefore, I think it will also be 
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ambiguous.  Because it deals with merger policy the decisions are not strictly pro-
consumer or pro-producer.  Rather it is between less efficient producers and producers 
who are seeking greater efficiency.   
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Chapter 4 
Model 
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In order to test these hypotheses I use variations of the model used by Amacher, 
Higgins et al.  It is: 
Cases = β0 + β1Business Cycle + β2Budget + β3President + β4Time + β5Time2  + ε, 
Where, 
Cases =                  the annual number of cases: 
Business Cycle =    the unemployment rate or real gross domestic product; 
Budget =                 the annual FTC budget; 
President =             a dummy variable representing the party of the president (if 
Republican =1) 
Time =                    a linear time trend; 
      ε   =                  the error term.   
 
 
The first hypothesis tested regards Robinson-Patman cases.  In this regression I 
expect the coefficient on the unemployment rate to be positive and the coefficient on real 
GDP to be negative.  The sign for the presidential dummy variable is expected to be 
negative.   
The second hypothesis tested is that concerning FTC cases.  FTC cases refers to 
cases brought by the FTC net of Robinson-Patman cases.  In this regression I expect the 
coefficient for unemployment to be slightly positive and the coefficient for real GDP to 
slightly negative for the period prior to 1950.  After 1950 I expect these results to 
maintain the same direction but in greater magnitude.  However, it should be noted that I 
am not entirely convinced of this due to the differing nature of the types of FTC 
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enforcement.  The coefficients for budget and president are expected to be similar to 
those in the Robinson-Patman cases.   
The third hypothesis tests to determine if second requests from the FTC under 
Hart-Scott-Rodino conform to Peltzman’s theory. A slightly different model is used to 
test this hypothesis.  It is: 
Second Requests = β0 + β1Business Cycle + β2Budget + β3President + β4Total 
Transactions + ε, 
In place of the time trend a variable representing the total transactions for which a 
second request could have been issued is used.  This variable represents all the 
notifications of mergers the Premerger Notification Office received, essentially all the 
mergers that met or exceeded the market cap limit for that year.  I expect this to better 
control for spurious factors related to both antitrust enforcement and the economy.  
Presumably there would be more mergers and, thus, the potential for second requests, 
during an economic expansion.  Using total transactions as an independent variable is 
intended to control for that.   
 I expect the sign on unemployment to be positive because this would mean 
antitrust enforcement is behaving in a countercyclical manner. If the unemployment rate 
is rising, the amount of antitrust enforcement can be expected to decrease if it conforms 
to Peltzman’s hypothesis.  I expect the sign on real GDP to be negative because this 
would imply a countercyclical nature of antitrust enforcement. If the economy is 
growing, and Petltzman’s hypothesis holds, then one would expect less antitrust 
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enforcement.  Again, I would like to reitierate that I am not as confident in this 
hypothesis as I am with the Robinson-Patman hypothesis because HSR actions involve 
mergers, rather than just price cuts.  Again, I do not expect the budget to have a 
significant impact on the level of regulatory activity.  I expect the sign for president to be 
negative as in the previous regressions; however, I expect that the magnitude will be 
greater.  This is because of the greater ideological divide that occurred between the two 
major political parties after the emergence of the Chicago School.  This school of thought 
posited that regulation in general served private, rather than public, interests.  This 
contrasts with the prior view that regulators mad decisions in the interest of society as a 
whole.  I expect this divergence in thought to have an effect on antitrust enforcement 
under differing political parties because the Chicago School seemed to be embraced more 
strongly by Republicans.  I expect the total transactions to have a positive, statistically 
significant effect on second requests.   
 In addition to running the two regressions based on the above model, I repeat 
them with an added dummy variable for years 1981-1986.  This is used to determine if 
antitrust enforcement changed under President Reagan’s first chairman, James C. Miller 
III,  as is widely believed.  I expect this dummy variable to have a negative coefficient.   
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Chapter 5 
Data 
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Cases, the dependent variable, is intended to represent the regulatory output of the 
FTC.  With regards to Robinson-Patman Cases3, it will measure cases brought under the 
Section 2 of the Clayton Act.  The Robinson-Patman cases span from 1937 to 1974.  
When examining FTC cases4, it will represent the all FTC cases not brought under 
Section 2 of the Clayton.  The FTC cases were available from 1916 until 1970.  While 
examining the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, Second Requests5 is used as the dependent 
variable.  These data are available from 1978 until the present.   
I use two measures of the business cycle.  They are the unemployment rate6 and 
real gross domestic product7.  The gross domestic product is held constant at 1996 dollars 
and was available for all years. The FTC budget8 was also available for all years.  When 
regressing the Robinson-Patman and FTC cases, the entire FTC budget is used.  This 
could lead to problems because a portion of the budget was spent on the Bureau of 
Consumer Protection.  The budget for the Bureau of Competition was available from 
1970 to 2008.  Therefore, it is used in examining second requests under Hart-Scott-
Rodino.  For fiscal year 1999 I excluded the portion of the total budget related to Y2K 
concerns because this was a one-time expenditure.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  This	  data	  were	  obtained	  from	  Posner	  (1976,	  p64).	  	  	  
4	  This	  was	  obtained	  from	  Posner	  (1970,	  p369).	  
5	  The	  data	  on	  second	  requests	  were	  obtained	  from	  the	  Hart-­‐Scott-­‐Rodino	  Annual	  Report	  to	  Congress	  for	  
years	  1978-­‐2008.	  	  	  
6	  The	  unemployment	  data	  were	  obtained	  from	  a	  Duke	  University	  database	  for	  years	  1916-­‐1947.	  	  For	  years	  
1948-­‐2008	  it	  was	  obtained	  from	  the	  Bureau	  of	  Labor	  Statistics.	  	  	  
7	  The	  real	  GDP	  data	  were	  obtained	  from	  the	  Bureau	  of	  Economic	  Analysis.	  	  	  
8	  This	  was	  obtained	  from	  the	  Annual	  Budget	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Appendix	  for	  years	  1916-­‐2008.	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The dummy variable for president is expected to capture any influence the 
president exerts on the Commission.  The time variable represents a linear time trend so 
as to allow for factors endogenous to the dependent and independent variables that may 
cause both to increase over time.  A squared term is also used to allow for declines 
caused by other factors, as with Amacher, Higgins et al.   
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Chapter 6 
Results 
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The results for Robinson-Patman cases support Peltzman’s hypothesis very well.  
The coefficient on lnGDP is of the expected sign and is statistically significant above the 
5%level.  It shows that for every 1% increase in real GDP, there is a 3.91% decrease in 
the number of Robinson-Patman cases brought by the FTC.  As expected, the variable 
lnftcbud did not have a statistically significant effect.  Unexpectedly, the presidential 
dummy variable, presdummy, also was not statistically significant.  The adjusted R2 for 
this regression was 0.4539.   
 Similar results are found for Robinson-Patman cases when using the natural log of 
the unemployment rate, lnunem, as an independent variable.  For every 1% increase in 
the unemployment rate, there was a 2.17% increase in Robinson-Patman cases.  Yet again 
the FTC budget and the political party of the president did not have a statistically 
significant effect on the number of Robinson-Patman cases.  The adjusted R2 for this 
regression was 0.6156.   
 The results regarding the FTC cases net of Robinson-Patman (or Section 2) cases 
are more ambiguous.  The first regressions cover the entire period (1916-1970) for which 
data was available.  When using lnGDP as the independent variable for measuring the 
business cycle, it has a coefficient of the expected sign but is not statistically significant 
with a t-statistic of only 1.62.  The budget and dummy variable representing the political 
party of the president do not have a statistically significant effect on the number of FTC 
cases brought.  The results are similar when using lnunem as the independent variable 
measuring the business cycle.  The coefficient for lnunem is -0.0567 but is not 
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statistically significant with a t-statistic of -1.33.   Again, the variables covering the 
budget and political party of the president are not statistically significant.   
 The results for the time period 1916-1950 are also ambiguous.  This, however, 
was expected.  For this time period the coefficients on lnGDP and lnunem are 1.47 and 
0.0765, respectively, but neither is statistically significant.  The variables representing the 
FTC budget and political party of the president were also statistically insignificant.  For 
the years 1951-1970 the results covering measures of the business cycle were also 
statistically insignificant; this was unexpected.  The coefficients for lnGDP and lnunem 
were 7.233 and -0.618 respectively.  These results were of the expected sign but were not 
statistically significant.  One reason these results might not conform to Peltzman’s 
hypothesis is the dual nature of non-Robinson-Patman cases instigated by the FTC.  
Some cases such as section 7 can be viewed as pro-producer, while others, such as false 
advertising, can be viewed as pro-consumer.  Because these different types of cases are 
considered together, it would make sense for them to lack statistical significance as a 
whole.   
 The results after the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act do not support Peltzman’s hypothesis.   
When using lnunem9 as the control for the business cycle, it is statistically insignificant.  
The FTC budget was also statistically insignificant.  The presidential dummy variable, 
however, was statistically significant at the 1% level with a t-statistic of -2.67.  When 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Because	  unemployment	  tends	  to	  be	  a	  lagging	  indicator	  of	  the	  economy	  the	  author	  used	  a	  lagged	  version	  
of	  this	  variable,	  but	  it	  was	  also	  statistically	  insignificant.	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controlling for the unemployment rate, the budget for the Bureau of competition, and the 
total amount of transactions, the FTC under Republican presidents issue 31.8% fewer 
second requests than the FTC under Democratic presidents.   
The results when using the real GDP as a measure of the business cycle provide 
evidence counter to Peltzman’s hypothesis.  The coefficient for the lnRGDP was -0.512 
and statistically significant at the 5% level.  This is not the expected sign.  There could be 
various reasons for this anomaly.  Second requests could behave differently than actual 
FTC cases with respect to the business cycle.  Antitrust enforcement could have 
undergone fundamental changes since Hart-Scott-Rodino that make it pro-consumer 
rather than pro-producer as traditional antitrust enforcement has been viewed, although I 
find this unlikely.  The Bureau of Competition budget, lncomp, was statistically 
insignificant with a coefficient of -0.238.  The presidential dummy variable was 
statistically significant at the 1% level with a coefficient of -0.276, meaning that the FTC 
in Republican administrations issues 27.6% fewer second requests than the FTC under 
Democratic administrations.   
It is likely that the HSR regression was not a pure test of the Peltzman hypothesis.  
A challenge to a merger can be viewed in multiple ways.  It could be pro-consumer if it 
prevents monopoly power.  However, it can also be anti-consumer if it prevents the more 
efficient delivery of goods.  The latter situation places producers in opposition to each 
other, with less efficient producers opposing a merger because it would allow their 
competitors to become more efficient.   
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Similar regressions, which replaced the presdummy variable with another 
dummy variable representing the tenure of FTC Chairman James C. Miller III, Miller, 
were also employed.  The coefficient for lnRGDP was -0.794 and statistically significant 
at the 1% level.  Again, this is not the predicted sign.  The coefficient for lnunem was -
1.187 and statistically significant at the 10% level; this differs from the previous 
regression using the unemployment as a measure of the business cycle when examining 
second requests.  This is also unusual because it has the same sign as lnRGDP, meaning 
that second requests behave counter to the business cycle when using real GDP, but 
behave pro-cyclically when using the unemployment rate.  The Miller dummy variable 
was expected to have a negative sign but was not statistically significant in either of the 
equations.   
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The Robinson-Patman cases support Peltzman’s hypothesis strongly.  This was to 
be expected because the Robinson-Patman Act is viewed as being blatantly pro-producer 
and can be expected to be enforced as such.  The Robinson-Patman cases also have fewer 
factors with the potential for spuriousness because it is essentially a price-fixing scheme.  
Because of the simplicity in which it behaves as pro-producer law, it can be expected to 
show the strongest results. 
 The regression using FTC cases net of Robinson-Patman cases did not show 
support for Peltzman’s hypothesis.  This is probably due to two reasons.  The first is that 
the FTC is responsible for enforcing some statutes that are inherently pro-consumer, such 
as laws concerning false advertising and antitrust enforcement.  Because the FTC cases 
net of Robinson-Patman cases have competing objectives, it is understandable that this 
measure would not confirm Peltzman’s hypothesis.  Future research could obtain data on 
the types of FTC cases filed and determine if section 7 cases alone conform to my 
hypothesis.  The second reason that FTC cases do not support Peltzman’s hypothesis is 
the large number of factors affecting a firm’s decision to merge.  The decision to cut 
prices (what Robinson-Patman regulates) is much simpler than the decision to merge.  
This complexity can be expected to introduce other variables that were not accounted for 
and would be difficult to measure.   
 The FTC second requests were different from both Robinson-Patman cases and 
FTC cases.  They were different from FTC cases in that the results were statistically 
significant.  They differed from the Robinson-Patman cases in that the results differed 
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based on the measure of the business cycle used.  Resolving this issue could provide 
fertile ground for future research.  The presidential dummy variable was statistically 
significant and greater in magnitude when looking at the FTC after Hart-Scott-Rodino; 
this shows support for my hypothesis that antitrust enforcement became more polarized 
between political parties after the emergence of the Chicago School.   
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FTC Budget 
(in real 1996 Dollars) 
Year Total              
(in 000s) 
Year Total          
(in 000s) 
Year Total          
(in 000s) 
1916 4647 1946 20933 1976 141469 
1917 16717 1947 19336 1977 150472 
1918 15214 1948 23871 1978 141124 
1919 9453 1949 24237 1979 125703 
1920 8371 1950 22762 1980 122161 
1921 8919 1951 25500 1981 111820 
1922 8768 1952 24547 1982 105342 
1923 9267 1953 24547 1983 96873 
1924 9055 1954 23599 1984 101448 
1925 8935 1955 24157 1985 89735 
1926 8990 1956 26230 1986 89776 
1927 8880 1957 30802 1987 86875 
1928 9616 1958 33579 1988 83819 
1929 12005 1959 34961 1989 84216 
1930 12840 1960 36254 1990 88158 
1931 21051 1961 41996 1991 92675 
1932 17521 1962 52025 1992 95145 
1933 15386 1963 59051 1993 99076 
1934 24021 1964 61309 1994 105012 
1935 22976 1965 67366 1995 101000 
1936 21126 1966 68134 1996 100690 
1937 22211 1967 70216 1997 102996 
1938 25776 1968 73970 1998 111130 
1939 26286 1969 81642 1999 118449 
1940 24549 1970 88470 2000 134663 
1941 23427 1971 95614 2001 136928 
1942 20750 1972 101396 2002 150931 
1943 18570 1973 107953 2003 154491 
1944 17948 1974 113627 2004 161479 
1945 17491 1975 128843 2005 157990 
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Bureau of Competition Budget 
(in real 1996 Dollars) 
year (in 000s) 
1978 63741.83 
1979 58567.36 
1980 58235.8 
1981 54933.99 
1982 50318.56 
1983 47085.75 
1984 43220.74 
1985 52345.69 
1986 51681.08 
1987 50959.35 
1988 47932.09 
1989 50453.47 
1990 30681.33 
1991 33448.96 
1992 32617.98 
1993 28626.38 
1994 21259.84 
1995 41508.49 
1996 40685.00 
1997 39948.4 
1998 47603.27 
1999 49401.84 
2000 49904.59 
2001 54705.92 
2002 56333.12 
2003 57635.17 
2004 57236.52 
2005 58859.59 
2006 56577.39 
2007 56595.15 
2008 54698.53 
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Cases 
Year Robinson-Patman Year Robinson-Patman 
1937 36 1956 31 
1938 19 1957 44 
1939 35 1958 76 
1940 43 1959 74 
1941 58 1960 144 
1942 19 1961 105 
1943 18 1962 41 
1944 22 1963 215 
1945 23 1964 25 
1946 12 1965 12 
1947 12 1966 16 
1948 43 1967 9 
1949 115 1968 4 
1950 22 1969 11 
1951 18 1970 11 
1952 17 1971 12 
1953 14 1972 1 
1954 15 1973 1 
1955 21 1974 6 
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Cases 
Year FTC cases                  
(net of Robinson-
Patman cases) 
Year FTC cases                  
(net of Robinson-
Patman cases) 
1916 1 1943 14 
1917 20 1944 8 
1918 64 1945 6 
1919 121 1946 9 
1920 18 1947 11 
1921 26 1948 11 
1922 32 1949 10 
1923 50 1950 5 
1924 51 1951 18 
1925 21 1952 16 
1926 4 1953 7 
1927 8 1954 11 
1928 10 1955 29 
1929 17 1956 22 
1930 12 1957 16 
1931 4 1958 13 
1932 3 1959 12 
1933 4 1960 26 
1934 14 1961 7 
1935 30 1962 15 
1936 33 1963 9 
1937 18 1964 12 
1938 28 1965 18 
1939 31 1966 19 
1940 33 1967 9 
1941 32 1968 15 
1942 16 1969 15 
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Business Cycle 
Year Real GDP                  
(Billions of 
1996 
Dollars) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Year Real 
GDP                  
(Billions 
of 1996 
Dollars) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
1916 $547 0.09 1963 2690 5.64 
1917 532 5.10 1964 2847 5.16 
1918 581 4.60 1965 3029 4.51 
1919 584 1.40 1966 3228 3.79 
1920 575 1.40 1967 3308 3.84 
1921 561 5.20 1968 3466 3.56 
1922 594 11.70 1969 3571 3.49 
1923 674 6.70 1970 3578 4.98 
1924 690 2.40 1971 3698 5.95 
1925 712 5.00 1972 3898 5.60 
1926 755 3.20 1973 4123 4.86 
1927 764 1.80 1974 4099 5.64 
1928 770 3.30 1975 4084 8.48 
1929 822 4.20 1976 4312 7.70 
1930 752 3.20 1977 4512 7.05 
1931 704 8.70 1978 4761 6.07 
1932 612 15.90 1979 4912 5.85 
1933 603 23.60 1980 4901 7.18 
1934 668 24.90 1981 5021 7.62 
1935 728 21.70 1982 4919 9.71 
1936 823 20.10 1983 5132 9.60 
1937 866 16.90 1984 5505 7.51 
1938 836 14.30 1985 5717 7.19 
1939 904 19.00 1986 5912 7.00 
1940 981 17.20 1987 6113 6.18 
1941 1149 14.60 1988 6368 5.49 
1942 1360 9.90 1989 6592 5.26 
1943 1584 4.70 1990 6708 5.62 
1944 1714 1.90 1991 6676 6.85 
1945 1693 1.20 1992 6880 7.49 
1946 1506 1.90 1993 7063 6.91 
1947 1495 3.90 1994 7348 6.10 
1948 1560 3.90 1995 7544 5.59 
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1949 1551 6.05 1996 7813 5.41 
1950 1687 5.21 1997 8160 4.94 
1951 1815 3.28 1998 8509 4.50 
1952 1887 3.03 1999 8859 4.22 
1953 1974 2.93 2000 9191 3.97 
1954 1961 5.59 2001 9215 4.74 
1955 2100 4.37 2002 9440 5.78 
1956 2141 4.13 2003 9501 5.99 
1957 2184 4.30 2004 9857 5.54 
1958 2163 6.84 2005 10153 5.08 
1959 2319 5.45 2006 10428 4.61 
1960 2377 5.54 2007 10641 4.62 
1961 2432 6.69 2008 10471 5.80 
1962 2579 5.57    
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Second Requests and Total 
Transactions under Hart-Scott-
Rodino 
Year Second 
Requests  
Total 
Transactions 
1978 23 355 
1979 58 868 
1980 36 824 
1981 46 762 
1982 26 713 
1983 20 903 
1984 37 1119 
1985 24 1301 
1986 32 1660 
1987 18 2170 
1988 39 2391 
1989 35 2535 
1990 55 1955 
1991 33 1376 
1992 26 1451 
1993 40 1745 
1994 46 2128 
1995 58 2612 
1996 36 2864 
1997 45 3438 
1998 46 4575 
1999 43 4340 
2000 43 4749 
2001 27 2237 
2002 27 1142 
2003 15 968 
2004 20 1377 
2005 25 1610 
2006 28 1746 
2007 31 2108 
2008 21 1656 
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Regression Results 
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Log of Robinson-Patman Cases 
1937-1974 
Independent Variable Real GDP  Unemployment 
lnRGDP -3.91   
 (-2.30)   
    
lnunem   2.17 
   (3.14) 
    
lnftcbud 1.557  0.323 
 (1.01)  (0.14) 
    
presdummy .016  -0.254 
 (0.04)  (-0.53) 
    
Time 0.7737  0.852 
 (4.07)  (2.91) 
    
Time2 -0.009  -0.010 
 (-2.89)  (-2.52 
    
Constant -9.51  -21.99 
    
    
Number of Observations 38  38 
F (5, 32) 7.15  8.56 
R2 0.5277  0.5271 
Adjusted R2 0.4539  0.6156 
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Log of FTC Cases 
1916-1969 
Independent Variable Real GDP  Unemployment 
lnRGDP 1.37   
 (1.62)   
    
lnunem   -0.567 
   (-1.33) 
    
lnftcbud 1.07  -1.07 
 (2.33)  (-0.82) 
    
presdummy .023  0.047 
 (0.11)  (0.17) 
    
Time -0.127  0.200 
 (-3.40)  (0.64) 
    
Time2 0.0004  -0.001 
 (0.79)  (-0.33) 
    
Constant -22.01  16.02 
    
    
    
Number of Observations 53  53 
F(5, 47) 3.31  2.64 
R2 0.2605  0.2193 
Adjusted R2 0.1818  0.6156 
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Log of FTC Cases 
1916-1950 
Independent Variable Real GDP  Unemployment 
lnRGDP 1.47   
 (1.45)   
    
lnunem   0.0765 
   (0.41) 
    
lnftcbud 1.40  1.13 
 (2.49)  (1.92) 
    
presdummy -0.39  -0.25 
 (-0.96)  (-0.59) 
    
Time -0.179  -0.193 
 (-2.44)  (-2.31) 
    
Time2 0.0009  0.003 
 (0.44)  (1.41) 
    
Constant -27.46  -13.73 
    
    
    
Number of Observations 33  33 
F(5, 27) 4.38  3.73 
R2 0.4479  0.4088 
Adjusted R2 0.3457  0.2994 
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Log of FTC Cases 
1950-1969 
Independent Variable Real GDP  Unemployme
nt 
lnRGDP 7.23   
 (1.36)   
    
lnunem   -0.618 
   (-0.84) 
    
lnftcbud -1.16  -0.961 
 (-0.80)  (-0.64) 
    
presdummy 0.014  0.038 
 (0.05)  (0.13) 
    
Time -0.111  0.112 
 (-0.88)  (0.73) 
    
Time2 -0.004  -0.0021 
 (-0.61)  (-0.29) 
    
Constant -31.96  19.49 
    
    
    
Number of Observations 19  19 
F(5, 27) 0.59  0.35 
R2 0.1847  0.1177 
Adjusted R2 -0.1288  -0.2217 
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Log of FTC Second Requests 
1978-2008 
Independent Variable Real GDP  Unemployment 
lnRGDP -0.512   
 (-2.14)   
    
lnunem   -0.107 
   (-0.26) 
    
lncompetitionbudget -0.238  -0.39 
 (-1.14)  (-1.46) 
    
presdummy -0.27  -0.319 
 (-2.51)  (-2.67) 
    
lntotal 0.276  0.0887 
 (2.42)  (0.59) 
    
Constant 8.71  7.41 
    
    
Number of Observations 31  31 
F( 4, 26) 7.01  5.01 
R2 0.5187  0.4353 
Adjusted R2 0.4447  0.3485 
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Log of FTC Second Requests 
(With Miller Dummy Variable) 
1978-2008 
Independent Variable Real GDP  Unemployme
nt 
lnRGDP -0.795   
 (-2.80)   
    
lnunem   -1.18 
   (-1.89) 
    
lncompetitionbudget -0.255  -0.861 
 (-1.11)  (-2.73) 
    
Miller -0.164  0.356 
 (-1.03)  (1.57) 
    
lntotal 0.361  -0.083 
 (3.05)  (-0.46) 
    
Constant 10.62  7.41 
    
    
Number of Observations 31  31 
F( 4, 26) 4.81  3.39 
R2 0.4251  0.3426 
Adjusted R2 0.3366  0.2414 
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